

Chapter VIII

PLANS AND PROGRAMS

The development of Army aviation between 1955 and 1962 must be viewed against the general background of national defense policy during that period. The late 1950s were in many ways a time of uncertainty and difficulty for the Army. Following the end of the Korean conflict came a series of strategic decisions known collectively as the New Look. The basic premise of this new strategic policy was defined by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in his massive retaliation speech in January 1954.

The keystone of this doctrine was the threat of the use of nuclear force and the selected use of weapons tailored to United States strategy rather than to moves or presumed intent of the enemy. This strategy was based on the belief that the threat of the use of nuclear weapons against an enemy's homeland or his armed forces could substitute for military manpower. Working from this hypothesis, the United States placed greater reliance on strategic nuclear air power and de-emphasized land, naval, and tactical air forces. For the Army, this policy meant that both men and money would be hard to come by for the development of any new missions or tactical concepts.

General Matthew B. Ridgway, the Chief of Staff of the Army, strongly opposed the New Look. He believed that whether nuclear weapons were used or not, it was the ground soldier who must finally achieve victory. General Ridgway realized, however, that the Army which had fought in World War II and Korea could not meet the challenge of the prospective nuclear battlefield. One solution for the Army to the problem created by the atomic age appeared to be a greater use of air power.

General Ridgway believed that if the Army was to become a streamlined, hard-hitting force, as many elements as possible must be transportable by air, both between continents and on the battlefield. Fixed land lines of communication and huge supply dumps would probably no longer be possible. More than ever before, aircraft would have to provide the means of troop transport, resupply, evacuation, and communications.

Of great concern to General Ridgway was the failure of the United States Air Force to make adequate provision for the future requirements of the Army. With the New Look, the Air Force devoted most of its attention to the formation of a strategic bomber force supported by high

performance jet interceptors. Little interest was shown in the development of close air support or in "low and slow" type aircraft needed by the Army. The Army required what amounted to aerial trucks and jeeps and combat aircraft which could serve as flying gun platforms. The Air Force made no effort to develop such aircraft. General Ridgway maintained that if the Air Force would not undertake such projects, the Army would have to in order to survive on the battlefield. He therefore determined that Army aviation would have to undergo an extensive reorganization to prepare it for the future. In order to provide adequate guidance for future developments, General Ridgway directed that a comprehensive Army aviation plan be developed.¹

Army Aviation Plan

On 4 September 1954, General Ridgway directed that a comprehensive review of the Army aviation program be undertaken as a first step in the preparation of the comprehensive Army aviation plan which he had called for. Thus, for the first time the Army attempted to prepare a long range program for aviation. In response to a Department of the Army request for input to the overall plan, OCAFF developed separate plans for Army aviation training, combat developments, and testing and development of Army aviation equipment.² These plans were forwarded to the Department of the Army on 30 September. The training plan provided separate courses, course locations, and student inputs for instruction through 1960. The combat developments plan outlined the role of OCAFF in the combat developments function, including the relationship with the Army Aviation School. The testing and development plan provided for the establishment of an Army Aviation Board, located at the Army Aviation School, to assume the responsibility and missions performed by the Army Aviation Service Test Division of OCAFF Board No. 6, Camp Rucker; the Aviation Branch, Aviation and Metro Division, Army Electronic Proving Ground, Fort Huachuca; and the Air Transportation Division, Transportation Research and Development Command, Fort Eustis.³

On 9 November, the Department of the Army forwarded to OCAFF for review and comment the proposed Army Aviation Plan, FY 1955-FY 1959, which was designed to provide long range Department of the Army guidance on the development of Army aviation. OCAFF, in turn, asked the service schools concerned, the Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College for comments and recommendations. Responding to the Department of the Army, OCAFF pointed out on 1 December two basic issues which had to be resolved prior to acceptance or rejection of the proposed Army Aviation Plan. First, definition was needed of what aviation missions were to be performed by the Army and the Air Force. Second, a decision then had to be made as to how Army aviation was to be organized to perform those missions. Until these issues could be resolved, OCAFF recommended that the plan not be presented to the Chief of Staff of the Army.

The Army Field Forces took this opportunity to make a number of specific recommendations regarding Army aviation. These included the establishment of a career management program for aviators, the expansion of training facilities, the establishment of an Army Aviation Center, and the assumption by the Army of the responsibility for depot supply and maintenance.

OCAFF also recommended that aircraft requirements be considered as tentative and valid for short range planning only pending the completion of OCAFF studies. Also needed was authority, together with appropriate agencies at the Department of the Army level, to investigate means of shortening the aircraft development-procurement cycle.

On 7 December, a conference was held on the Army Aviation Plan attended by General John E. Dahlquist, the Chief of Army Field Forces, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Department of the Army. At this conference, OCAFF once again recommended the establishment of an Army Aviation Center and that the Department of the Army should proceed immediately to solve the career problems of Army aviators that had arisen. OCAFF also recommended that training should be emphasized and that the Department of the Army should initiate action to take over depot maintenance and supply. Conference discussions also included the Army's maximum use of Air Force and Navy procurement facilities. OCAFF wanted assurances that the proposed expansion of the Department of the Army G-3 Army aviation functions would not duplicated those of OCAFF.

On 18 December, the Department of the Army asked OCAFF for concurrence and comment on a draft summary sheet for the Chief of Staff of the Army. This document summarized the planned expansion of Army aviation and the proposed Army Aviation Plan. It also included comments from the field and recommended courses of action. These actions included the centralized control over aviation personnel by the Department of the Army, G-1, and the establishment of an Army Aviation Center and Army Aviation Board at Camp Rucker. Moreover, a general officer with the responsibility for overall supervision and coordination of the Army aviation program should be added to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Department of the Army.

The Chief of Army Field Forces would be charged with conducting all flight and technical training of Army aviation personnel in the zone of the interior. He also would be charged with making recommendations to the Department of the Army concerning all aspects of the combat and services development of aviation used by the Army in the field to include organizational matters, integration of aviation into units, tactical and logistical employment of aviation, and recommending the types, characteristics, and capabilities of aircraft to be used. The Department of the Army recommended the Army assumption of depot supply and maintenance responsibilities and the implementation of planning studies and tests to resolve the basic problems of Army aviation as related to personnel, organization, developments, construction, procurement, supply, maintenance, and command. OCAFF, with most of its previous objections satisfied, concurred in the content of the summary sheet on 22 December 1954.⁴

While the comments from the field on the proposed Army Aviation Plan were generally favorable, they were not unanimously so. For this reason, G-3 submitted specific recommendations relating to Army aviation to the Chief of Staff of the Army rather than the complete plan. On 11 January 1955, the Army Policy Council approved these Army aviation recommendations, including those relating to OCAFF. As a result of this decision, the Department of the Army directed the Commanding General, Continental Army Command (CONARC) to recommend the

mission and organization for the Army Aviation Center and the Army Aviation Board.⁵ The Army Aviation Center had been officially established at Camp Rucker on 1 February. CONARC Board No. 6 was also established at Camp Rucker to replace the Army Aviation Test Division of CONARC Board No. 5. The Department of the Army requested CONARC to provide plans under which it would execute its responsibilities for all aviation flight and technical training of Army aviation personnel in the zone of the interior.⁶

On 12 April the Department of the Army requested that CONARC prepare detailed plans for training sufficient aviators in FY 1956 to meet all aviator requirements Army-wide by the end of fiscal years 1956-1957. CONARC recommended on 29 April a means of reaching the objectives by the end of FY 1957. The Department of the Army revised the desired requirements and recommended a plan which was approved by the Army Aviation School on 11 May and by CONARC three days later. The FY 1956 Fixed Wing Training Plan was published by the Department of the Army on 13 June and was forwarded by CONARC to the Army Aviation School for implementation on 27 June.⁷

Despite the failure of the original Army Aviation Plan to gain approval, the Army Aviation Division of G-3 still strongly believed that a document was required which would outline official guidance for the development of the Army aviation program. On 17 September 1955, therefore, the Department of the Army forwarded to CONARC for comments a draft plan for Army aviation for fiscal years 1956 to 1960. The plan outlined seven primary functions of Army aviation and discussed required aircraft, personnel, training, installations, and research and development programs. In comments submitted on 11 October, CONARC nonconcurred with the Army assumption of a function of close air support within the time frame of the plan and recommended that a requirement for optimum close support aircraft be placed on the Air Force.

After seeing the revised Army Aviation Plan, General Dahlquist on 30 December again voiced strong objections to the Department of the Army G-3 about Army plans for procuring and testing currently available aircraft in the close support role. He pointed out that CONARC's comments on Project ABLE BUSTER, submitted earlier that month, had also included this recommendation.⁸ General Dahlquist stated that he was not aware of any reductions which could be made in the field army as the result of adding organic light attack aircraft to perform the close support role. If the Army were to assume this new function, it should first determine the most advanced weapon system it could attain by the early part of the 1960-1970 decade and then concentrate on the development of an optimum weapon system which would meet the requirements of warfare during that period. He charged that the plan overlooked the urgent necessity of placing a firm requirement on the Air Force for the development of an optimum close support aircraft. General Dahlquist therefore recommended again that this requirement be placed on the Air Force while the Army simultaneously initiated a comprehensive study of weapons systems, which might include aircraft, to undertake the missions being performed by close support aircraft. He did not consider that the procurement and testing of currently available light aircraft and munitions would contribute toward that goal.⁹

Because controversy continued regarding various aspects of the Army Aviation Plan, the Department of the Army convened a conference in Washington on 24 January 1956 to settle on the recommendations to be made to the Chief of Staff of the Army. Attending the conference were General Dahlquist, Lt. Gen. Willard G. Wyman, the CONARC Deputy Commanding General who was to succeed General Dahlquist in March, and, from the Department of Army, the DCSPER, DCSLOG, DCSOPS, Director of Army Aviation, and the Director of Development and Chief of Aircraft and Electronics from the Office of the Chief of Research and Development. The purpose of the conference was to agree on a position for the Army's requirement for direct support aviation, National Guard and Army Reserve aviation units, the need for a heavy helicopter, and the requirement for a fixed wing cargo aircraft of greater than 5,000 pounds empty weight.

The conferees agreed that the Army should proceed without delay in the development of aircraft to control the trajectory of ground launched missiles against point targets. They recommended that the Army request the Air Force to develop an aircraft specifically designed for the close support mission. The Army would participate in all phases of the development, but use Air Force funds. In combat, these aircraft were to be placed under the operational control of the Army. This recommendation was later modified by the Chief of Staff of the Army; he simply dispatched a memorandum to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force stating the Army's requirement for close air support and asking how the Air Force intended to meet that requirement. The Army Aviation Plan, as originally presented to the conference, had included a provision that unless the Air Force met the request for a close air support aircraft, the Army would sue for revision of support functions to allow it to assume responsibility for development of such aircraft. But neither the majority of the members of the conference nor the Army Chief of Staff was willing to go that far in this controversial area.

The conference recommended that the twenty-seven National Guard divisions be provided aircraft for their organic aviation. Army procurement was limited to a 40-division force, nineteen of which were Regular Army. The six National Guard divisions with the highest mobilization priority would receive 100 percent of authorization. Total aircraft for fifteen divisions would then be distributed among the remaining twenty-one National Guard divisions. No aircraft would be authorized to Army Reserve divisional units, and only such support units in the Army Reserve necessary for the support of the first forty divisions should receive organic aircraft. The conference also recommended that no pure aviation units should be activated in the National Guard. Separate aviation units should be activated in the Army Reserve, as necessary, to provide required support for the forty division force, but the level of equipment would be subject to the availability of funds.

The conferees concurred in the requirement contained in the plan for a heavy helicopter to provide an interior 5-ton lift and to operate a crane with a capacity of eleven tons for short hauls. They believed that successful development of the H-16 helicopter would meet both these requirements. The conference also supported the requirement for a fixed wing cargo aircraft of greater than 5,000 pounds empty weight. This support was based on the belief that this probably

would be the largest fixed wing aircraft capable of operation in forward areas and that it would be an economical and essential complement to the helicopter for troop movement and logistical support within the combat zone.

Maj. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, who had become the first Director of Army Aviation on 1 January 1956, presented the recommendations of the conference to General Maxwell D. Taylor, the Chief of Staff of the Army, later the same day. The latter approved all of the recommendations on 5 March, with the exception noted above regarding close air support. The Army Aviation Plan, FY 1956-1960, was then revised and approved for publication on 16 March.¹⁰

As a result of a presentation on the status of the Army Aviation Program made by the Director of Army Aviation to the Commanding General, CONARC, on 12 September 1956, six days later CONARC provided the Department of the Army with recommendations on the scope and content of the program. CONARC pointed out that many of the controversial aspects of the Army Aviation Program which were mentioned during the Director of Army Aviation's presentation possessed such far-reaching implications that CONARC could not furnish definitive answers to the problems without considerable study, testing, and detailed evaluation.

On 18 September, CONARC also furnished a summary of aircraft required in proposed TOEs for the ROCAD (armored), ROTAD (airborne), and ROCID (infantry) divisions and for the experimental helicopter reconnaissance unit scheduled for testing in the SKY CAV II troop test during Exercise SLEDGE HAMMER.¹¹ This summary indicated that 60 or 70 aircraft would be required to perform the normal missions of a division aviation company plus SKY CAV missions and about 26 aircraft would be required in SKY CAV type units.

CONARC still felt that the division commander had a continuing day-to-day need for light cargo helicopters for tactical movements of small units, for SKY CAV roles, and for emergency resupply. CONARC also felt that the program for twelve aviation battalions should not be revised downward from a required lift point of view. CONARC advised that the program be reviewed in light of industry's ability to support it, the capacity of the training establishment and manpower resources to provide the qualified personnel to man the units, and also the advisability of transferring a portion of the program to the Reserve Components.

CONARC's position on maintenance within the twelve battalion program was that maintenance should be at battalion level rather than decentralized to companies. As regards the advisability of a part of the twelve helicopter battalion program being transferred to the Reserve Components, CONARC stated that this could be determined only after an exhaustive investigation of the sources of qualified active Army personnel to man the units and provide maintenance. Other considerations were the availability of sufficient interested reserve component aviation personnel in the proper grades and ranks, and the ability of the active Army training establishment to provide necessary training support.

Another matter which had been discussed at CONARC on 12 September was an aero-reconnaissance concept, under which a special type unit equipped with Army aircraft would, in addition to the three principle elements found in a SKY CAV type unit possess a fourth element equipped with helicopters armed for offensive operations. On 18 September, CONARC pointed

out that the aero-reconnaissance concept differed from the SKY CAV concept in tactics and techniques. CONARC felt that a light cargo helicopter was needed to transport ground vehicles along with ground reconnaissance elements. In addition, the larger helicopter was of greater value than the utility helicopter in tactical movements of small units and in emergency resupply operations. The employment of armed helicopters offered interesting prospects worthy of further development and tests.¹²

Late in 1956, the Army Aviation Directorate undertook the first revision of the Army Aviation Plan. The title was changed to "The Army Aviation Guidelines for the Development of Doctrine and Organization through FY 1961," which more accurately reflected the purpose and the contents of the document. In December, the Department of the Army forwarded this document to CONARC for comment and concurrence. While this plan was not to be considered inflexible, it was regarded as firm guidance to agencies and commands concerned with Army aviation matters, subject to annual revision.

On 8 January 1957, CONARC forwarded to the Department of the Army its views on the proposed document after consulting the CONUS armies, selected units, and certain of the combat arms service schools. One of the matters of major policy significance was whether the Army or the Air Force had primary interest in the conduct of battlefield surveillance which indicated that, "The basic responsibility for aerial surveillance will be that of the Air Force," with the Army using its observation aircraft and surveillance helicopters to "thicken Air Force coverage over the immediate battle area."

CONARC's comments to the Department of the Army pointed out that the policy decision of the Secretary of Defense on 26 November 1956 had stated in part that, "The Army Aviation Program will consist of those types of aircraft required to carry out the following Army functions envisaged within the combat zone: ...observation, visual and photographic, reconnaissance, fire adjustment, and topographical survey." In view of this Department of Defense policy statement, CONARC recommended to the Department of the Army that the definition of battlefield surveillance be amended to include the following: "The Army has a primary interest in the conduct of battlefield surveillance in the combat zone. Air Force tactical reconnaissance will assist the Army in this function. Aerial surveillance beyond the combat zone is the responsibility of the Air Force." The Department of the Army accepted this amendment, and the Chief of Staff approved the revised plan on 14 February 1957.¹³

Department of Defense Policies

Controversy regarding the interpretation of their aerial missions, as they related directly to ground combat, had existed between the Army and the Air Force ever since the National Security Act of 1947. Attempts had been made to clarify these missions with the Key West agreement of 1948 and two memoranda of understanding signed by Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., and Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter on 2 October 1951 and 4 November 1952. The latter memorandum placed a weight restriction of 5,000 pounds on Army fixed wing aircraft.

This limitation was subject to review by the Secretary of Defense upon the request of either service secretary.

The air transportation of Army supplies, equipment, personnel, and small units within the combat zone became a primary rather than a limited or emergency function of Army aviation. The combat zone was redefined so as to extend from 50 to 100 miles in depth. Other primary functions included aerial observation; control of Army forces; command, liaison, and courier missions; and aerial wire laying within the combat zone. Two activities, not previously included, were added at this time—artillery and topographic survey and aeromedical evacuation within the combat zone. Evacuation was to include battlefield pickup of casualties, air transport to the initial point of treatment, and any subsequent move to hospital facilities within the combat zone.

Primary functions of the Air Force in support of ground operations were restricted to the following: airlift of Army supplies, equipment, personnel, and units from the outside to points within the combat zone; airlift for the movement of troops, supplies, and equipment in the assault and subsequent phases of airborne operations; airlift for the evacuation of personnel and materiel from the combat zone; and aeromedical evacuation of casualties to points outside the combat zone.¹⁴

The reorganization of Army aviation and the initiation of a long range Army aviation program by General Ridgway led to growing concern on the part of the Air Force. General Nathan Twining, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, charged that the proposed expansion of Army aviation could bring duplication and waste. This charge resulted from the proposal in the Army Aviation Plan to increase aircraft from 3,516 to 8,486 by 1959, while at the same time increasing personnel from 13,024 to 48,479. Another source of concern to the Air Force was the Army's interest in the T-37 jet reconnaissance airplane.

In January 1956, Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker decided to request the removal of the 5,000 pound limit on fixed wing aircraft contained in the 1952 Memorandum of Understanding. General Taylor, Frank G. Millard, the Army General Counsel, and the Military Council all cautioned against making such a proposal because of the adverse impact it might have on the pending Joint Chiefs of Staff decision of the T-37 question.

Secretary Brucker waited until September before he broached the subject of removing the weight restriction to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson. Negotiations between Brucker and Wilson continued through October into November. Wilson indicated he might agree to an amendment of the weight restriction rather than its complete removal. Brucker then proposed a maximum payload radius capacity of 1,200 ton-miles to permit development of an airplane capable of operating from forward landing areas less than 600 feet in length and carrying a 4-ton cargo for a mission radius of 300 nautical miles. Secretary Wilson on 20 November, however, informed the Armed Forces Policy Council that he wanted to retain the weight restriction, but would consider making exceptions for specific aircraft. In response to this statement, Secretary Brucker asked for procurement authority for five new 3-ton transports which exceeded the weight restriction. Secretary Wilson approved the transport procurement exception.

On 26 November 1956, Secretary Wilson issued a memorandum which attempted to clarify the previous service agreement and again defined the missions of the services. The Wilson memorandum retained the 5,000 pound limit on fixed wing aircraft and imposed a 20,000 pound weight limit on helicopters. Secretary Wilson did permit the Army to request specific exceptions to these limitations. A significant change made by the Defense Secretary was the redefinition of the combat zone as an area not more than 100 miles forward of the general line of contact. The extension of the combat zone to the rear of the line of contact was to be designated by the appropriate field commander, but normally would also be 100 miles. Within this 200 mile combat zone, it was proper for the Army to use organic aircraft.

In his attempt to define missions, Secretary Wilson forbade Army aircraft from strategic and tactical airlift during airborne operations, airlift and medical evacuation from points within the combat zone to points without, medical evacuation from an airhead where the airborne operation included air-landed logistical support by the Air Force, tactical reconnaissance, interdiction of the battlefield, and close combat air support.

Despite the apparent restrictiveness of the 26 November memorandum, the door was left open for the continued expansion of Army aviation. The provision for exceptions to the weight limitations permitted the Army to develop larger aircraft. The memorandum did not limit the performance of Army aircraft in the combat zone, although the weight limitation did affect performances. The new definition of the combat zone gave Army aircraft twice the operational distance than did the Pace-Finletter memorandum of 1952.¹⁵

On 18 March 1957, Department of Defense Directive 5160.22 was issued reaffirming the previous provisions of the Pace-Finletter agreement and the modifications made by Secretary Wilson. The directive reconfirmed the Air Force roles in strategic and tactical airlift, tactical reconnaissance, interdiction, and close air support. It also stipulated that there should be no unnecessary duplication or overlapping among the services, a proviso that would lead to continuing controversy.¹⁶

In October 1959, the Army tested the use of divisional combat reconnaissance companies equipped with armed helicopters. The decision prompted Air Force speculation that this might be the first move toward eventual Army assumption of the functions of battlefield interdiction and close combat air support. In the field of tactical surveillance, the Army had made considerable progress in the use of electronically equipped fast drones to monitor enemy movements, acquire target information, and report on the results of missile firings. Another significant increase in battlefield surveillance had been made with the mounting of side-looking airborne radar on aircraft, which flew parallel to the area being scanned instead of traversing hostile territory.

Despite the limitations imposed by the Department of Defense, the Army intended to take full advantage of the air for travel, observation, and communication to ensure the success of the land battle. The Army asked private industry for assistance in developing some major technological improvements in aircraft design to tailor aircraft to the jobs they must perform instead of tailoring battle missions to the capabilities of existing aircraft.¹⁷

Personnel Policies

All the planning and policy directives relative to Army aviation would be meaningless unless the necessary number of aviators could be obtained and given the career incentive to remain in the program. Army aviation had its own peculiar personnel problems. Since Army aviation was a specialty and not a branch, problems arose in providing an adequate number of pilots while ensuring proper career development and progression for aviators. The grade distribution of aviators also caused concern early in the period. The use of a greater number of warrant officer pilots and the training of senior officers as aviators helped to solve this problem. Despite difficulties, the Army during this period continued to develop a corps of highly trained and motivated pilots to meet the needs of the expanding program.

Review of Officer Grades for Army Aviators

An Army Aviation Officer Career Program had been formulated by the Department of the Army G-1 in 1950, but had been suspended the following year until the rapid Korean conflict personnel expansion was over. General Ridgway's directive in 1955 reorganizing Army aviation reinstituted this program. Studies made by the Department of the Army G-1 indicated that the existing grade spread for Army aviators was greatly at variance with the overall grade structure of the Army. The bulk of Army aviators by May 1955 were predominantly in the lower officer grades, only 4 percent being above the grade of major.

On 6 July 1955, G-3, Department of the Army, requested the assistance of CONARC in the solution of the problems with the grade structure of Army aviation officer personnel. Correction of this situation, G-3 pointed out, was necessary in the interest of developing an Army Aviation Officer Career Program which would attract and retain capable officers.

A related problem cited by G-3 resulted from the requirement for keeping a sufficient number of these officers assigned to higher command and staff positions in other types of activity, over and above the number actually needed to fill positions requiring rated aviators. This measure was necessary in order to keep officers from becoming overspecialized; it also ensured enough technically trained personnel for the expansion of Army aviation activities during mobilization. Under existing TOE and TD grade authorizations, however, most Army aviators were in the grade of captain or lower, whereas many of the higher command and staff positions through which it was desirable to rotate these officers called for field grade officers.

As an immediate and partial solution to these problems, G-3 proposed three measures. First, the maintenance of authorized overages of Army aviation officers in the higher grades. Second, a review of current TOE to determine whether the Army aviation grade authorizations were realistic and equitable. Third, a careful scrutiny of the experimental TOE being tested in the ATFA project to assure the grade authorizations for Army aviation positions were commensurate with the duties and responsibilities of such positions.¹⁸ CONARC was requested to recommend the desired percentage of overage in each grade, and review the Army aviation space authorizations in current TOEs and recommend revisions where appropriate. They were also to

carefully scrutinize the grade authorizations in the experimental TOE for suitability of the grades authorized.

CONARC concluded that it was undesirable to remedy defects of the grade structure by authorizing overages in certain grades. Authorization of grade overages for Army aviation officers would result in proportional reductions in other branches in order for the Army to stay within its overall officer grade ceilings. Moreover, the projected expansion of Army aviation would absorb some of the excess of company grade aviators and thus bring the grade distribution more nearly in line with the Army-wide distribution. CONARC determined that the number of Army aviators authorized for the current year provided an adequate base for expansion during mobilization. The Army aviators authorized as of 1 September 1955 would be adequate to support an Army expansion of approximately four times its current strength.

CONARC replied to the Department of the Army on 1 September, suggesting that a better way to strengthen the Army aviation mobilization base would be to procure more aviators in the reserve components. The headquarters pointed out that, in the current National Guard troop basis, approximately 1,000 TOE spaces were authorized for aviators, but as of 1 June 1955, only 810, or 73 percent, of these spaces were filled. The current Army reserve troop basis contained 2,821 aviator spaces, but as of 30 June 1955, only 1,018, or approximately 36 percent, were filled.

As requested by the Department of the Army, CONARC reviewed all current TOE which contained spaces for rated aviators. A study of the grade spread of aviation officers authorized in the type field army as compared to that of all officers in the type field army disclosed numerous inequities. Accordingly, CONARC recommended upgrading or downgrading aviator spaces in twenty of the TOEs. Thus in the case of the infantry division, which was authorized 1 lieutenant colonel, 5 captains, and 22 lieutenants, CONARC recommended that these 28 spaces be regraded to 1 lieutenant colonel, 1 major, 5 captains, 16 lieutenants, and 5 warrant officers. Because only 4.8 percent of the 919 commissioned officer spaces in the type field army were of field grade, CONARC recommended that this be raised to 5.6 percent.

The most sizable reallocation of grades recommended by CONARC was the conversion of 42.6 percent of the rated aviator spaces in the type field army to warrant officers. This recommendation was based on a previous CONARC view that aviator duty positions requiring tactical or technical knowledge in addition to skill as a pilot should be filled by warrant officers. The analysis of aviator grade authorizations in the ATFA tables was held in abeyance pending completion of Exercises BLUE BOLT II and SAGE BRUSH.

As the result of CONARC's recommendations and its own studies, the Department of the Army G-1 instituted a new Army Aviation Officer Career Program. One solution to the problem of the shortage of senior aviator officers was the sending of senior and general officers to flight training to assignments involving aviation. By July 1959, there were eleven generals on flight status. The Chief of Transportation in 1954 had also proposed the use of warrant officer aviators and during 1955 applications began to be accepted from enlisted men throughout the Army for training at Fort Rucker as warrant officer candidates.¹⁹

Recommendations for Warrant Officer Aviators

In addition to the 1954 recommendation of the Chief of Transportation, CONARC on 30 March 1955, forwarded to the Department of the Army results of a study concerning the desirability and feasibility of utilizing warrant officer and enlisted pilots (fixed wing) in lieu of officer pilots. The study included information regarding the number of TOE and TD positions in which warrant officer pilot spaces required during fiscal year 1956; the scope of OCS-type training deemed desirable for enlisted men taking flight training for duty as warrant officer pilots; the location; feasible starting date, and required input for such training.

CONARC recommended that enlisted personnel not be used as pilots at that time and that warrant officer pilots be used in the combat arms and technical services where the requirement for command and leadership was not present. As regards requirements for warrant officer pilots, CONARC reported that of the 3,190 aviator spaces that would be required by the Army during fiscal year 1956, 1,227 could be filled by warrant officers and that, of these, 439 should be fixed wing qualified and 778 should be rotary wing qualified only. These figures were exclusive of Transportation Corps requirements, but included the three proposed fixed wing transport aviation companies.

CONARC also recommended that OCS-type training of ten weeks' duration be given at the Army Aviation School prior to flight training. Based on an overall attrition rate of 50 percent, CONARC recommended that the total input to this training be 3,054, but that it be phased over a 3-week period. CONARC estimated that six months lead time would be required for the Army Aviation School to initiate the proposed preflight or OCS-type training and that seventeen officers and fifty-four enlisted men would be required to conduct the training. CONARC's recommendations were accepted for the most part and training of warrant officer candidates began at Camp Wolters in November 1956.²⁰

Aviator Requirements

As a result of White House and Congressional interest in reducing the costs involved in proficiency flying, Department of Defense Directive 1340.4, Proficiency Flying Programs, was published on 29 May 1959. This directive required that the services institute a program to review and validate requirements for aviators to ensure that only those with real potential were retained on flying status. Only the minimum flying essential for retention of aeronautical skill was permitted. As a corollary to this directive, AR 600-105, Army Aviation Officer Career Program, was republished on 21 August 1959. This regulation for the first time established four categories of assignment for Army aviators. Category I included positions where the primary duty was pilot, or the direct command of aircraft in a unit below battalion level. Command staff positions where flying was a requisite skill, but not required as the primary duty, were encompassed in Category II. Category III comprised career development assignments necessary to improve the aviator's qualification as an Army officer, provided such assignments did not exceed two consecutive years' duration. Finally, aviators assigned to primary duties other than those described above would be placed in Category IV and be indefinitely suspended from flying

status for the period of such duties. If such duties extended for more than three years, the individual would be eliminated for the Army aviation program.²¹

An annual review and validation of requirements for aviators was required by the Department of Defense directive. To accomplish this review, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, appointed an ad hoc committee to recommend FY 1961 requirements and authorizations for Army aviators, forecast in general terms the requirements for aviators through FY 1970, and generally review the career development of Army aviators. The committee developed criteria for determining Army aviator positions. It also queried the major field commands as to their requirements for aviators. The committee made an individual review of all field grade positions. Future requirements were computed on the basis of projected aircraft inventories and a continuation of existing organization and employments of Army aviation.

The ad hoc committee determined that the FY 1961 Army aviator authorizations be set at 6,449—5,299 officers and 1,150 warrant officers—and apportioned to the major commands by grade and branch as a ceiling under which assignments would be made. The committee also recommended that a small increase be made in training field grade officers, to include eight colonels, and that the Department of the Army DCSPER consider greater utilization of warrant officers. The existing 20 percent career management factor for officer aviators below the rank of colonel would be retained and branch qualifying assignments for officer aviators would be accorded the highest priorities.²²

The rapid aviation expansion as a result of the Berlin Crisis negated many of the findings of the committee. The committee's deliberations, however, were a reflection of the Army's continuing efforts to come to grips with its long term aviator requirements.

Planning for Future Development

With the formal adoption of a helicopter weapons system, the successful development of the air cavalry troop, and the plans for the proposed utility tactical transport company, the time had come to formulate a unified airmobile program.²³ During 1960 and 1961, CONARC formed two committees and a board to study the future of Army aviation. The Rogers Board, officially designated as the Army Aircraft Requirements Review Board, met early in 1960 to study to Army's future needs for aircraft. This was followed by the Rogers Committee on Army Aviation which developed a training program to support Army aviation expansion. In 1961, the Ad Hoc Committee to Study Aircraft Armament Systems was convened.

Army Aircraft Requirements Review Board (Rogers Board)

On 15 January 1960, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed the establishment of the Army Aircraft Requirements Review Board. Chaired by Lt. Gen. Gordon B. Rogers, the board was directed to recommend as a matter of first priority the course of action to meet the requirements during the 1960-1970 time period for light observation aircraft and to explore the possible courses of action to improve the Army's capabilities in the areas of surveillance and tactical transport. The Board was to recommend a priority for development to include the specific

developments to be initiated with FY 1961 research, development, test, and experimentation funds. Finally, the board was to submit its best estimate of the Army's requirements during the 1960-1970 time period, supported by a proposed procurement program, to include cost and quantities by year, of current and future types of aircraft.

Some steps had already been taken in the development of a long range aircraft program. In October 1959, the Chief of Research and Development had initiated a plan which would develop firm guidance for Army aviation for the period, 1960-1970. Army Study Requirements (ASRs) describing broad development objectives in the area of light observation, manned surveillance, and tactical transport aircraft were prepared and presented to industry on 1 December 1959. The latter submitted 119 design concepts as solutions to the problems presented by the ASRs.

Industry design concepts were evaluated during February 1960 in two phases. During Phase I—1 to 15 February—a technical evaluation was conducted under the direction of the Chief of Transportation. In Phase II—16 to 28 February—an operational evaluation was conducted under the direction of the Chief of Research and Development. The Phase II operational evaluation teams prepared and presented their results to the Rogers Board.

After receiving general background orientation briefings, the Rogers Board received the reports of the three operational evaluation teams. Following each presentation, the members of the teams concerned and consultants from the National Aeronautics and Space Agency, Bureau of Weapons, Marine Corps, Transportation Corps, and Signal Corps were questioned by the Board. The Board's conclusions and recommendations were made against this background and submitted to the Department of the Army on 10 March 1960.

The Rogers Board recommended that a design competition be conducted to develop a light observation aircraft. More than one design should be selected and at least two be developed through flying prototype testing prior to selection of the final production design. The selected design would be procured in FY 1964 to meet the requirement for the light observation aircraft. Existing observation aircraft—the L-19, H-13, and H-23—would be phased out and replaced by the new helicopters. Long range research efforts for the light observation aircraft mission should be continued toward improvement of helicopter performance, economy, and efficiency of operation in the field.

The Board's recommendations regarding surveillance aircraft were dependent on the development of equipment and techniques. It recommended that increased effort be placed in FY 1961 on the development and testing of sensory devices for manned aircraft. Increased emphasis also was needed for the development of secure data link transmission systems capable of transmitting information gathered deep in hostile territory to ground stations with minimum time delay and loss of quality. Equipment and techniques for receiving, processing, and interpreting the data collected by airborne surveillance systems needed to be developed simultaneously and with the same priority as the surveillance systems. The requirement for an organization for processing and interpretation activities should be reviewed by CONARC. The board recommended that a study on survivability should be completed prior to 1 January 1961 for use in the preparation of the military characteristics of a new manned deep penetration

surveillance aircraft. Subject to the outcome of studies on aircraft survivability and satisfactory assurance of the availability of suitable surveillance equipment, the Rogers Board recommended that a new manned deep penetration surveillance aircraft be developed beginning with FY 1962 funds, with the objective of providing operational aircraft no later than 1970.

The Rogers Board recommended establishing a policy of replacing each aircraft model at least every ten years, or sooner if warranted by operational requirements or state-of-the-art advances.

The Board recommended that operational studies be made to determine specific requirements for Army airlift of supplies, equipment, and personnel within the combat zone to support contingency plans, with emphasis on the equipment of the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) in specific operational areas.²⁴ If these operational studies did not establish a high priority requirement for a larger than 3-ton aircraft, the Board recommended that a program be established with the objective of providing a vertical/short take off and landing (V/STOL) replacement for the HC-1 helicopter and the AC-1 airplane, with initial production deliveries in the early 1970s. These two aircraft were just entering service in 1960, and by the Board's criteria, would be due for replacement in the 1970s. Research and study should continue to determine the technical and operational feasibility of V/STOL aircraft to meet future Army requirements.

The areas of study, research, and development listed below, in order of priority, were those required to support the Board's conclusions and recommendations:

1. Continuation of aircraft under development to include projects in direct support of these aircraft.
2. Development of a new light observation aircraft.
3. Studies and tests on aircraft survivability and operation of aircraft at low altitude and high speed to provide information required prior to initiating development of a manned surveillance deep penetration aircraft.
4. Development and test of sensors, processing, and interpretation equipment, and avionics equipment.
5. Studies on the requirements for airlift to support contingency plans.
6. Development of V/STOL research aircraft for technical and field evaluation.
7. Study and tests on noise level and downwash problems.
8. Long range research to improve helicopter performance.
9. Research on propulsion systems.
10. Research on ground effects machines.

The Board developed a procurement program for the coming decade. The proposed light observation aircraft would be introduced as rapidly as practicable, and, by FY 1970, would nearly meet active Army TOE requirements. The L-19, H-13, and H-23 aircraft were provided as interim substitutes until the higher performance aircraft became available to meet the needs of table of allowance (TA) and Reserve Component units. By about 1973, all requirements were expected to be met with the new aircraft.

The procurement program give first priority support to the UH-1 utility helicopter. By 1970, all foreseen Active Army TOE requirements would be provided, in addition, to some TA. Orderly phase-out of L-20, H-19, H-21, and H-34 aircraft would take place through transfer to the TA and Reserve Forces Training Base as new aircraft became available. The HC-1 transport helicopter and the AC-1 transport airplane were to be introduced at a rate compatible with production capacity and to meet the requirements of planned TOE Active Army units by 1968-1969. Existing U-1A airplanes and H-37 helicopters would be phased out simultaneously into the training base or disposed of. The AO-1 surveillance aircraft would be bought at the most advantageous pace so as to achieve a reasonable Active Army TOE capability by 1965-1966. The quantitative requirement generated by this aircraft would be the subject of restudy by the staff.

The Rogers Board believed that by 1965 the current research and development effort would produce air-to-surface point and area weapons ready for installation in one or more tactical aircraft. The funds earmarked by the Board were an estimate of those required to provide installation of the weapons on Army aircraft. A small fund was also earmarked for limited purchases of essentially commercial model aircraft for training and for augmentation of the L-23 fleet.

Funds also earmarked by the Board in modest amounts late in the 1960s provided for initial procurement of a deep penetration surveillance aircraft, that would be a replacement for the AC-1 and the HC-1, and an aerial crane. The Board could not predict the quality or the timing for these aircraft. The Board's philosophy in submitting these three items was to point out the major problem implicit in these areas. At the same time it wished to indicate the earliest time in which funding support must begin to provide a significant capability by about 1975.

Maj. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, then serving as Chief, Military Advisory Group, Korea, submitted a memorandum to the Rogers Board which had far reaching implications. He pointed out that the latest studies had assigned combat units additional quantities of light aircraft. While substantial benefits would accrue from this, these assigned and attached aircraft would simply improve the ability of units to execute their conventional missions. The employment of aircraft would be restricted to those missions.

General Howze proposed that the Army proceed at once with the development of fighting units whose mode of tactical employment would take maximum advantage of the unique mobility and flexibility of light aircraft. These aircraft would provide not only mobility for some riflemen and machine gunners, but also direct fire support, artillery and missile fire adjustment, command, communications, security, reconnaissance, and supply benefits.

Missions which General Howze believed to be appropriate for assignment to these air-mobile—which he called air cavalry—units were: the seizure of critical terrain in advance of larger forces, delaying action and cover for the withdrawal of larger forces, raids, penetration of shallow enemy positions and the disruption of enemy rear areas, pursuit and exploitation, the protection of a long flank, and wide reconnaissance. He felt that new weapons developments would provide air cavalry units with destructive fire power. Air cavalry would be particularly

appropriate in any battle area in which the threat of area weapons forced wide troop dispersion and in brush fire actions against relatively unsophisticated opponents.

To test the concept, General Howze recommended the formation of an experimental air cavalry unit in one of the airborne divisions. Assuming that the concept proved sound, he estimated that one air cavalry regiment consisting of about 175 utility helicopters and 85 light observation helicopters would be needed for each corps of 3 divisions. For the active Army this would mean about 5 regiments totaling about 875 utility and 425 light observation helicopters. General Howze admitted that this concept would be costly, but considered this development a vital requirement in the evolution of a modern Army.

The Rogers Board found that the aircraft acquisition objectives it had developed for the UH-1 and light observation helicopters were compatible with the development of General Howze's concept. Sufficient aircraft could be found in the existing inventory to permit activation of the proposed experimental unit. The Board recommended that DCSOPS, Department of the Army, and CONARC be directed to study the feasibility of the concept of air fighting units and their armament. They also were to look into the desirability of activating an experimental unit to test the feasibility and develop materiel requirements.

The aircraft procurement figures developed by the Rogers Board provided part of the basis for the training program later proposed by the Rogers Committee. Of greater importance, however, was the influence of the Rogers Board on the Howze Board two years later.²⁵

Rogers Committee on Army Aviation

Following the completion of the work of the Rogers Board on aircraft requirements, the next logical step was to develop a training plan. On 28 July 1960, General Bruce C. Clarke, the Commanding General, CONARC, directed General Rogers to chair a committee to study the training requirements to support the Army Aviation Program, 1960-1970, developed by the Rogers Board earlier in the year. The Rogers Committee convened at Fort Monroe on 15 August and, in conjunction with working groups, continued in session until 22 December. Information was compiled from trips, special questionnaires, working group meetings, discussions, and interviews with selected individuals.

General Clarke directed the committee to submit appropriate findings and recommendations in the following areas: the degree to which Department of the Army approved operations and training programs for Army aviation were compatible with resources made available to CONARC; the adequacy and suitability of Army aviation construction programs to meet current and projected training requirements; the degree to which the current and projected training programs for Army aviation would provide the correct skills in the proper proportion to meet the requirements of the Department of the Army Aviation Program; and the extent of Army aviation activities that could be consolidated, reduced, or eliminated without significant loss of operational effectiveness.²⁶

The committee submitted its final report on 22 December. It found that modifications to the current Army Aviation Training Program—which had been published on 19 September 1958 as

part of the Army Aviation Guidelines for the Development of Doctrine and Organization Through Fiscal Year 1963—were necessary in order to provide the correct skills in the proper proportions to meet the requirements of the Department of the Army Aviation Program. The approved FY 1961 operation and training programs for Army aviation were not compatible with the resources made available to CONARC. The Army's current and planned construction programs were not adequate to meet the needs of the Army Aviation Program.

Based on these conclusions, the committee made numerous recommendations. Among the sixteen which the Commanding General, CONARC, could implement were the initiation of helicopter gunnery training in the advanced tactics phase of the observation and utility/transport helicopter course and the revision of the current preflight training program for warrant officer candidates, to include combined arms tactical training similar to that presented in existing officer candidate courses. The committee also recommended that the CONARC commander revise the current applicable programs of instruction of the service schools to provide detailed instruction of officers in duties and responsibilities for exercising command and tactical employment of Army aviation units.

The committee recommended the establishment of the aviation program as a designed program of special interest under an activity monitor to ensure coordination and timely actions in programing and budgeting. Two recommendations related specifically to training facilities. Programing actions were needed to provide additional resources at Camp Wolters, Fort Rucker, Fort Benning, or another suitable site to permit continuation of planned and future tests involving jet aircraft. The committee felt that plans should be developed for providing a long range Army aviation training complex to support the quantitative and qualitative growth potential and mobilization requirements of the expanding program.

In addition to actions which the CONARC commander could take, the committee made twenty recommendations for consideration by the Department of the Army, most of which were related to personnel changes. The committee recommended the establishment of the enlisted, officer, and warrant officer aviator requirements as valid planning objectives for the period through FY 1970 and the modification of the current imposed aviator rated ceilings in order to be in consonance with the recommended personnel planning objective.

A major problem since the beginning of Army aviation had been the maintenance of adequate career development for officer aviators. The committee recommended that officer aviators spend at least one year out of every five on basic branch material assignments in order to maintain branch proficiency and that the policy apply to all officer aviators through the grade of major. Assignments for colonel and lieutenant colonel would be dictated by requirements determined by the career branch. The committee also recommended modification of the grade distribution for officer aviators to provide qualified individuals in the program for the optimum period of time in order to reduce replacement training costs. Warrant officer aviators should be assigned to those branches of the service that had a requirement for them, and regulations pertaining to the current warrant officer career program should be revised to provide for an adequate warrant officer aviator career field. The committee proposed modification of the

criteria to permit substitution of warrant officer aviators for certain officer aviator positions in combat and support type units, and the subsequent modification of the TOE to reflect these conversions. Further, the committee recommended a review and adjustment of warrant officer utilization after experience had been obtained and performance and utilization factors analyzed.

Like the findings of the Rogers Board, many of the recommendations of the Rogers Committee on Army Aviation were soon overtaken by events or were modified by the Howze Board in 1962. Nevertheless, the work accomplished by the committee provided the foundation for the rapid expansion of aviation training which was to take place in the 1960s.²⁷

The Berlin Crisis

The partial mobilization of reserve forces and the expansion of the active Army in the fall of 1961 as a result of the crisis in Berlin created problems for Army aviation. Although plans were under development for an orderly long range expansion of the aviation program, the Berlin crisis required an immediate and unexpected expansion.

The Berlin crisis, which began to escalate in the summer of 1961, occurred at a most inopportune time for the Army. President John F. Kennedy, who had recently assumed office, directed a thorough reappraisal of strategic plans, force levels, and military programs with a view to determining their adequacy to fulfill commitments. He directed the Secretary of Defense to develop a force structure in harmony with United States military requirements. This structure was to be determined without regard to arbitrary or predetermined budget ceilings. At about the same time, the Army began to take steps to reorganize its tactical division organization as a result of experience with the PENTOMIC organization. The ROAD division would have greatly increased aviation assets.²⁸ Both the reappraisal of the force structure and the division reorganization would have a significant impact on the form and extent of the aviation program.

The Army build-up which resulted from the Berlin crisis mobilized 119,622 members of the reserve components and an increase of 86,481 in the active Army. Included in the reserve mobilization was the 32d Infantry Division and the 49th Armored Division. Most of the increase in the active Army went to bringing a 6 division STRAF force and the units in USAREUR to full strength. After considerable debate, the Department of Defense agreed to a permanent increase of two divisions in the force structure. This required the activation of the 5th Infantry Division and the 1st Armored Division in early 1962 so they could complete organization and training before the relief of the two National Guard divisions from active duty.

Problems were encountered in equipping the National Guard divisions, including a shortage of helicopters. The helicopter shortage also had a serious effect on several mobilized non-divisional units. One temporary solution was the redistribution of equipment from low priority units to those oriented to reinforcing Europe. For example, on 23 March 1962, the Department of the Army directed withdrawal of fifteen H-19 helicopters from active Army units and the further redistribution of ten H-19 helicopters within CONARC to meet the training requirements of four reserve medical air ambulance companies. The Department of the Army also diverted to those companies six new H-23D helicopters destined for the U.S. Army, Pacific.

An amendment to the FY 1962 budget permitted the Army to procure ten additional AO-1 surveillance aircraft and seventy-six H-23 observation helicopters. These aircraft were scheduled for delivery by 30 June 1962.²⁹

Aviator Shortages

The buildup of the Army during 1961, coupled with past and projected shortfalls in programed inputs to the Army Aviation School, resulted in substantial shortages of aviators necessary to fill TOE/TD positions worldwide. The Army's end FY 1961 aviator strength was 6,531 against a requirement of 7,149. This disparity was expected to increase in FY 1962 when the anticipated strength of aviators would be approximately 6,700 versus a requirement for 7,900. Included in aviator requirements, in addition to allowances for training, transients, and patients, was a 20 percent factor which represented those aviators on branch qualifying ground duty. The Army was faced with the problem of meeting flying requirements at the expense of branch tours or vice versa. Long lead time training made it difficult to overcome these difficulties on a short term basis.

This critical shortage of aviators was reflected in CONARC units. To alleviate this shortage, the Department of the Army reemphasized aviator recruiting and provided additional guidance pertaining to applications for aviation duty and effective use of current assets. Another step taken was the training of additional warrant officer aviators and the conversion of certain commissioned officer spaces to warrant officers. CONARC directed the CONUS army commanders personally to encourage qualified lieutenants and enlisted men to volunteer for aviation training. Until increased procurement could ease the situation, effective use of available assets supplemented by exceptions to permanent change of station restrictions to reassign aviators returned to aviator duty afforded some relief. These measures resulted in some improvement in the situation by the end of FY 1962, but increased requirements placed a constant drain on resources.³⁰

Mobilization of Reserve Aviation Units

Eight major Army aviation units were called to active duty for a period of one year during the partial mobilization in the fall of 1961. These units were:

Unit	Station
32d Aviation Company	Fort Lewis
32d Infantry Division	
149th Aviation Company	Fort Polk
49th Armored Division	
1063d Aviation Company	Fort Riley
136th Transportation Company	Fort Riley
24th Medical Company	Fort Leonard Wood
132d Medical Company	Fort Bragg
152d Medical Company	Fort Ord
317th Medical Company	Fort Sam Houston

The 136th Transportation Company and the 24th, 152d, and 317th Medical Companies were assigned to the STRAC. The 32d and 149th Aviation Companies, 1063d Transportation Company, and 132d Medical Company were assigned to an additional two-division force consisting of the 32d Infantry Division and the 49th Armored Division.

All of the mobilized aviation units experienced much the same problems. These mainly involved administration, qualification of personnel, lack of training, and shortages of equipment. Much difficulty was experienced in updating personnel records and procuring adequate copies of Army regulations, other administrative publications, and training publications. Flight records were often not forwarded to active duty stations, particularly for filler personnel. Incorrect and incomplete processing of flight physicals for filler personnel resulted in long delays in receiving flight status orders. A number of Army reserve aviators could not meet required medical standards.

A large number of enlisted men and some officers were assigned a duty MOS they were not capable of performing. Many primary MOSs had been awarded based on only two weeks of on-the-job training at a summer camp. A number of aviators who were former Navy or Air Force pilots had not attended the tactical flight training course at the Army Aviation School and did not qualify as Army aviators. Specific details as to service school requirements were not known in most units. As a result, in many cases quotas were available, but requirements were unknown to higher headquarters.

Preparation Overseas Replacement (POR) and Preparation Overseas Movement (POM) training had not been emphasized while in reserve status. A delay in the regular training program resulted after the unit reported for active duty until such required training was complete. Few aviators in helicopter units were qualified in anything but the observation helicopter. Individuals generally were not qualified in their primary MOS. Delays were experienced in sending these people to school. In many cases, unit training was handicapped by the temporary loss of these men while in school. Shortages of equipment, including aircraft, excessively delayed training.

Existing critical shortages of aircraft and support equipment were exacerbated by the call-up. Although aircraft were redistributed within the active Army and large numbers of observation helicopters were withdrawn from the National Guard, it was still impossible to attain full authorizations of aircraft. All aviation units attained a reasonable degree of training readiness despite equipment shortages.³¹

Deployments to Europe

By January 1962, more than 40,000 active Army troops had been sent to Europe as part of the Berlin buildup. Included in these deployments were three Army aviation units, the 90th Transportation Company (medium helicopter) from Fort Knox, the 45th Medical Company (air ambulance) from Fort Bragg, and the 15th Medical Detachment (helicopter ambulance) from Fort Ord.

After lengthy high level discussion, the decision was made to preposition equipment in Europe for two additional divisions and ten nondivisional units rather than actually deploying

the units. Full authorizations of H-34 and L-20 aircraft were prepositioned in USAREUR for the 4th Infantry Division and the 2d Armored Division. At the same time, efforts were made to modernize the equipment of the forces permanently stationed in Europe. Despite the serious shortages of aircraft in CONUS, quantities of UH-1 helicopters and AO-1 airplanes were sent to Europe during this period.³²

With the release of the mobilized reserve component units and individuals in August 1962, the permanent strength of the Active Army was established at 960,000 men. For the force structure, this meant an increase of 90,000 men and two divisions. Except for the aviation units for the two new divisions, there was no immediate impact on the Army aviation program which had been developed before the mobilization. The experience gained during the mobilization, however, would be of use three years later when the rapid expansion for Vietnam began.

Southeast Asia Deployments

Even while attention was focused on Berlin and preparations to reinforce Europe, another major crisis was developing. Organized Communist guerrillas threatened to overthrow the government of the Republic of Vietnam. The United States developed counter-measures to meet this increased Communist threat and gave increasing support in equipment and advisor teams to the established government.

At the same time that the Berlin crisis was causing the deployment of aviation units to Europe, the deteriorating situation in Vietnam led to the deployment of six Army aviation units to Southeast Asia. These units were:

Unit	Station	Date
8th Trans Co	Fort Bragg	20 Nov 61
57th Trans Co	Fort Lewis	8 Nov 61
93d Trans Co	Fort Devens	24 Nov 61
18th Avn Co	Fort Riley	14 Jan 62
HHD, 4th Trans Bn	Fort Sill	8 Jan 62
57th Med Det	Fort Meade	8 Mar 62

These units originally deployed on a temporary change of station basis, a status subsequently changed to permanent change of station. In addition, the 33d Transportation Company at Fort Ord was alerted for movement to USARPAC on 15 March 1962, an order which was canceled a week later.³³

Accomplishments of the Period

The years from 1954 to 1962 proved to be crucial to the development of Army aviation. Although disputes regarding missions and functions continued with the Air Force, the decision of Secretary Wilson in fact gave the Army authority to form and equip the types of aviation units which suited its needs.

Of key importance was General Ridgway's order to formulate a coherent Army aviation plan. Though the plan encountered obstacles and appeared at various times under various guises, it

provided for the first time an overall program for the development, expansion, and use of Army aviation. The program developed during this period was limited by the technical limitations of available aircraft. By 1960, however, greatly improved aircraft were becoming available which increased the capabilities of the Army's air arm. The recommendations of the Rogers Board and Rogers Committee pointed the way to an even more expanded aviation program in the following decade. Even though the Howze Board was to radically change the course of Army aviation, the findings of this board were based upon the foundations established by General Ridgway's aviation plan and the Rogers reports.

The formation and deployment of aviation units during the Berlin crisis and the first year of active United States involvement in Southeast Asia was on a limited scale. Nevertheless, the experience gained in these actions was to prove valuable in the following years during the dramatic expansion of Army aviation to meet requirements in Southeast Asia.

The planning and program development at the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, and CONARC would have been of limited practical value with the organization which existed in 1954. In the following chapter, the organizational changes at Department of the Army, Transportation Corps, and CONARC levels necessary to carry out the expanded Army aviation program will be examined. From the Department of the Army down to company level, significant changes took place to reflect the new doctrine, equipment, and role of Army aviation.

Endnotes

Chapter VIII

1. General Matthew B. Ridgway, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), pp. 298-299, 312-315.
2. Army Ground Forces was redesignated the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces on 10 March 1948. OCAFF was the field operating agency of the Department of the Army within CONUS for the general supervision, coordination, and inspection of the training of all units and individuals employed in a field army. OCAFF also retained functions relating to the development of tactical and technical doctrine and the supervision of research and development. The six CONUS armies and the Military District of Washington were made major commands under the direct control of the Chief of Staff of the Army. Jean R. Moenk, *A History of Command and Control of Army Forces in the Continental United States 1919-1972* (CONARC: 15 Aug 72), p. 29 (hereafter cited as Moenk, *Command and Control*).
3. (1) DA ACofS G-3 Army Avn Div Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 55, p. 1 (TOP SECRET—Info used is UNCLASSIFIED) (2) CONARC Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 55, G-3 Sec Doc and Req Div, Jul-Dec 54, p. 7.
4. (1) CONARC Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 55, Vol. IV, Cbt Dev Sec Gen Div, Jul-Dec 54, p. 4. (2) Richard P. Weinert, *A History of Army Aviation, 1950-1962: Phase I: 1950- 1954*, CONARC, Jun 71, pp. 52-55 (hereafter cited as Weinert, *Army Aviation*).
5. The Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces was reorganized and redesignated as Headquarters, Continental Army Command, on 1 February 1955. The command had responsibility over the six armies in the continental United States, the Military District of Washington, and such other units, activities, and installations as were assigned by the Department of the Army. See Moenk, *Command and Control*, pp. 35-36.
6. (1) DA ACofS C-3 Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 55, Army Avn Div, p. 1 (TOP SECRET—Info used is UNCLASSIFIED). (2) Ltr G-3 AV PO 1, DA G-3 to CG CONARC, 16 Feb 55, subj: Army Aviation Plan. (3) History U.S. Army Aviation Center and Army Aviation School, 1954-1964, pp. 24,50.
7. CONARC Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 55, Vol. VI, G-3 Sec Tng Div, Jan-Jun 55, p. 15.
8. For a discussion of Project ABLE BUSTER, see below.
9. (1) CONARC Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 56, Vol. IV, Cbt Dev Sec Div, Jul-Dec 55, p. 6. (2) Ltr ATSWD-G 360(C), CG CONARC to DA ACofS G-3, 10 Dec 55, subj: Army Aviation Plan.
10. (1) MFR, DA DCSOPS, 25 Jun 56, subj: Conference Aviation Plan FY 56-60. (2) CONARC Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 56, Vol VIII, Cbt Dev Sec Gen Div, Jan-Jun 56, p. 1. (3) DA DCSOPS Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 56, Army Avn Dir, p. 1. (TOP SECRET—Info used is UNCLASSIFIED).
11. For a description of SKY CAV and Exercise SLEDGE HAMMER, see below.
12. CONARC Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 57, Vol. II, Army Avn Sec, Oct-Dec 56, pp. 3-5.
13. (1) CONARC Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 57, Vol. II, Army Avn Sec, Oct-Dec 56, pp. 2-3. (2) DA DCSOPS Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 57, Army Avn Dir, p. 2 (TOP SECRET—Info used is UNCLASSIFIED).
14. Weinert, *Army Aviation*, pp. 12, 24-26, 48-49.
15. (1) Draft ms, History of Army Aviation, Ch VII, pp. 41-43, in CMH files. (2) DA DCSOPS Army Avn Dir Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 57, pp. 1-2.
16. (1) A Short History of Close Air Support Issues, HQ USACDC, Jul 68, pp. 44-45. (2) Charles H. Donnelly, *United States Defense Policies Since World War II* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 74. (3) Charles H. Donnelly, *United States Defense Policies in 1957* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 65-66.

17. *United States Defense Policies in 1960* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 79-80.

18. For a discussion of ATFA, see below.

19. (1) CONARC Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 56, Vol. II, G-3 Sec Org & Equip Div, Jul-Dec 55. (2) Draft ms, History of Army Aviation, Ch VIII, pp. 7-9, in CMH files. (3) Camp Rucker was redesignated Fort Rucker and established as a permanent Department of the Army installation on 13 October 1955.

20. CONARC Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 55, Vol I, Introductory Narrative, Pt B, pp. 33-34; Vol II, G-3 Sec Trn Div Sp Tng Br, p. 6; and Vol VI, G-3 Sec Tng Div, p. 15.

21. AR 600-105, Army Aviation Officer Career Program, 21 Aug 59.

22. DA ODCSPER Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 60, pp. 142-144.

23. See below.

24. Three of the six divisions that formed the Strategic Army Forces (STRAF) in CONUS were reduced in strength and lacked essential combat support; their main function was training recruits. The other three divisions formed the STRAC, a CONUS-based reserve maintained to meet immediate force development requirements of cold, limited, or general war. At this time it was composed of approximately 115,000 men in the Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps, and the 82d Airborne Division, 101st Airborne Division, and 4th Infantry Division. U.S. Army Expansion, 1961-1962, OCMH, 1963, p. 22.

25. (1) Ltr, Lt Gen Gordon B. Rogers to CofSA, 10 Mar 60, subj: Army Aircraft Requirements Review Board. (2) CONARC Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 60, Vol V, Mat Dev Sec Army Avn & Abn Div, Jan-Jun 60, p. 6. (3) DA DCSOPS Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 60, pp. C-1 to C-6 (TOP SECRET—Info used is UNCLASSIFIED).

26. (1) CONARC Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 61, Vol VI, Army Avn Sec, Jul-Dec 60, pp. 12-13. (2) Ltr ATCG, CG CONARC to Lt Gen Gordon B. Rogers, 28 Jul 60, subj: Directive for the Conduct of a Study of Training in Support of the Army Aviation Program of the Department of the Army.

27. Ltr, Lt Gen Gordon B. Rogers to CG CONARC, 22 Dec 60, subj: Requirements for Training in Support of the Army Aviation Program, 1960-1970.

28. For a discussion of the PENTOMIC and ROAD organization, see below.

29. U.S. Army Expansion, 1961-1962, pp. 9, 26, 78-80, 164-165, 223-224, 240-241, 245, 254.

30. (1) CONARC Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 62, Vol II, DCSPER P&D Div, Jul-Dec 61, pp. 13-14, and Dist Div, Jan-Jun 62, p. 12. (2) DA DCSOPS Dir of Army Avn Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 61, p. B-III-2 (TOP SECRET—Info used is UNCLASSIFIED).

31. CONARC Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 62, Vol VI, Army Avn Sec, Jan-May 62, pp. 1-3.

32. (1) U.S. Army Expansion, 1961-1962, pp. 187, 263. (2) CONARC Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 62, Vol VI, Army Avn Sec, Jan-May 62, p. 4.

33. (1) U.S. Army Expansion, 1961-1962, p. 5. (2) CONARC Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 62, Vol VI, Army Avn Sec, Jan-May 62, pp. 4-5.